Originalism As An “Ism” by Macey, Jonathan R
HeinOnline -- 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 301 1995-1996
ORIGINALISM AS AN "ISM"
JONATHAN R MAcEY*
1. INTRODUCTION
Outside the comfortable confines of the Federalist Society,
originalism is far from fashionable. Indeed among constitutional
law scholars at elite schools, the idea of being an originalist is
tantamount to being some sort of intellectual Luddite. As Robert
Bork discovered at his confirmation hearings, those who are
originalists lack intellectual respectability. And, as Judge Bork
noted subsequently, "[i]n the legal academies in particular, the
philosophy of original understanding is usually viewed as thor-
oughly passe, probably reactionary, and certainly-the most
dreaded indictment of all-'outside the mainstream.'''l For this
reason alone, particularly because so many Federalists are
originalists, it seems to me to be a good idea to address the issue
of originalism broadly rather than simply arguing that it pro-
ducf : desirable results in particular cases.
The purpose of this Article is to accomplish two objectives.
First, I want to make the point that despite the professed antipa-
thy for originalism, originalism is not nearly as rare as one might
think. Indeed, I will argue that the very constitutional scholars
who decry originalism most loudly rush to use originalist argu-
ments when they serve their purposes.
The second goal of this essay is to make the point that the
basic pragmatic defense oforiginalism is highly problematic. The
pragmatic defense of originalism is that it avoids the problem
thatjudges will assert their own vision of the good as law. Because
constitutional interpretations from the originalist position are
complex, difficult, and subject to various interpretations by well-
meaning scholars, the danger of willfulness exists simply because
judges will be tempted to put their hands on the scales ofjustice
to generate outcomes that they favor.
It is important to observe at the outset that, at least in my view,
constitutionalism is, of course, an "ism" like socialism or fascism
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143 (1990). Bork went on to note that the fact that originalists are considered outside of
the mainstream "says more about the lamentable state of the intellectual life of the law,
however, than it does about the merits of the theory." [d.
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or communism or, more happily, capitalism, in the sense that it
refers to a philosophical orientation that relates to social order-
ing, a commitment to a hierarchical approach to law in which
the interpretation of the Constitution is considered to trump
other more transient values and norms. In sum, then, originalism
is defensible not because it restrains judges completely, or even
well, but because it restrains judges better than alternative meth-
ods of judging. The point is that defenders of originalism give
originalism a bad name by suggesting that originalism is a pan-
acea for the problems ofjudicial willfulness and overreaching. It
is not. Rather, originalism is defensible because, despite its myr-
iad imperfections, it is vastly superior to alternative methods for
deciding constitutional cases in a constitutional system of di-
vided, and separated powers.
Turning to Lillian BeVier's remarks about Gerald Gunther,2 I
think Gunther has it absolutely right when he argues thatjudicial
review is not a natural or inevitable outgrowth of constitutional-
ism. That is to say, it is perfectly possible to have a Constitution
without judicial review because it is possible to have a govern-
ment in which there is a strong norm that the government can-
not exceed its constitutional powers. But that does not answer
the question which institution is to decide whether the govern-
ment has exceeded its constitutional powers and when there is a
conflict with the Constitution.
But to me, although Gunther is right about this, he is asking
the wrong question. The fact is that we live in a post-Marbury v.
Madison!' age, in which judicial review is a well-settled matter of
constitutional law. In this environment, the issue is whether
originalism is desirable. That is the argument to which this Arti-
cle now turns.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORIGINALISM
The basic argument against originalism is that it cannot be
done because it is impossible to avoid the temptation to twist the
constitutional text to meet one's own needs or what one per-
ceives to be the needs of society in changing times and circum-
stances. Alternatively, it generally is assumed that originalism is
impossible because the original document, either standing alone
2. See Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality ofOriginalism, 19 HARv.J.L. & Pun.
POL'y 283 (1996).
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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or supplemented by contemporaneous historical sources, simply
does not generate an8'vers to modern legal questions of constitu-
tional interpretation.
The example of abortion comes to mind in this context. Of
course the Constitution does not address the issue directly. To
adjudicate the constitutionality ofa statute limiting abortion, one
must have a theory of constitutional interpretation. Robert
Bork's originalist theory of constitutional interpretation requires
that judges "find the meaning of a text-a process which in-
cludes finding its degree of generality, which is part of its mean-
ing-and to apply that text to a particular situation ...."4
However, Bork recognizes that finding the appropriate level of
generality to be used to resolve a particular problem is itself not
merely difficult; it involves a contextual approach to the constitu-
tional analysis. He writes:
With many if not most textual provisions, the level of general-
ity which is part of their meaning is readily apparent. The
problem is most difficult when dealing with the broadly stated
provisions of the Bill of Rights.... [A] judge should state the
principle at the level of generality that the text and historical
evidence ·warrant.5
But even Bork has trouble applying his interpretive rule that the
Constitution must be interpreted in its historical context. From a
historical perspective, there is no doubt that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause6 was drafted to give equal legal rights to blacks.7 But
does Bork's historical perspective mean that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause applies only to blacks, in which case discrimination
against whites would be perfectly acceptable? He says no, on the
grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment states, "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.,,8 Because the language of the
amendment refers to "persons" rather than blacks, Bork reasons
that the drafters of the amendment were attempting to achieve
racial equality.9
4. BoRK, supra note I, at 149.
5. [d.
6. See U.s. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
7. See BoRK, supra note I, at 180.
8. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
9. See BoRK, supra note I, at 149.
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The point here is that originalism is not nearly so determinate
as its most vocal proponents would suggest. Sophisticated
originalists, like Judge Bork, readily admit to the indeterminacy
of an originalist approach, even as to simple matters such as the
constitutionality of reverse discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment The point here is that an originalist cannot credi-
bly claim that his approach is superior because it provides perfect
clarity, or even that it constrainsjudges. Mter all, if the originalist
approach is indeterminate, willful judges will be able to use this
indeterminacy to justify whatever results they want on originalist
grounds.
Moreover, it seems clear that there is something much worse
about willful originalism than other sorts of outcome-oriented
judging. This is because other sorts of outcome-oriented judging
are more honest. Take, for example, Laurence Tribe. His ap-
proach to constitutional adjudication is almost entirely results-
oriented. But at least he is honest about it, more or less. For ex-
ample, in addressing abortion and other issues for which there is
a result that Tribe clearly wants to reach, Tribe derives his so-
called "antisubjugation principle," which "finds" in the Four-
teenth Amendment the notion that the Framers generally in-
tended "to break down legally created or legally reenforced
systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class
citizens."10
Tribe at least is being honest-or transparent-in the imposi-
tion of his own principles as constitutional values. He thinks it is
a bad idea for women to be subordinated, and that laws protect-
ing unborn children do just that. Tribe then translates this view
of the good into a constitutional norm. But Tribe does more
than this. Like Bork, Tribe tries to maintain fidelity to the Fram-
ers' original understanding of the Constitution by tying his argu-
ment to the Thirteenth Amendment's concept of involuntary
servitude. Tribe then concludes (I am not making this up) that
this supports a constitutional right to abortion:
To give society-especially a male-dominated society-the
power to sentence women to childbearing against their will is
to delegate to some a sweeping and unaccountable authority
over the lives of others.... Even a woman who is not pregnant
/ 10. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrmmONAL LAw 1515 (2d ed. 1988).
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is inevitably affected bt; her knowledge of the power relation-
ships thereby created. 1
The point here is not that Tribe's bizarre attempt to ground
his personal vision of the good in the Framers' original under-
standing is convincing. Rather, the point is that once judicial re-
view becomes a feature of a legal system, as it has in the United
States, there is a danger that the constitutional text will be trans-
formed to coincide with the political interests ofwhoever is inter-
preting the document. Moreover, the people doing the
constitutional manipulation will lay claim to the originalist man-
tle, as Tribe has done.
The reason this manipulation is possible is because all mecha-
nisms of constitutional interpretation-including Judge Bork's
originalism-require that judges at least should "expound" the
law made by the Framers.12 But as Judge Bork readily admits,
expounding on the meaning of the Constitution means declar-
ing what its meaning is. And it is not enough to say that a judge is
bound by prior decisions, because, in the most difficult cases,
there is no applicable precedent. And even when there is a direct
precedent, in our post-Warren and post-Brennan court era, there
is no reason to think that the available precedent will reflect the
Framers' intentions.
III. THE GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF ORIGINALISM
Another way of looking at the analysis presented above is that
it implies that originalism exerts a very strong gravitational pull
on constitutional scholarship and adjudication. In fact, it may be
the case that the schism between the originalists and the non-
originalists is not really quite so great.
The nonoriginalists will say, "You know, the results generated
by originalism are bad somehow in this context, so we're not go-
ing to use them because we have to have a living Constitution
that evolves and changes to meet changing circumstances." But
the implication of this analysis is that the original doctrine has
undergone, by choice, by necessity, or perhaps by subterfuge, a
variety of permutations so the current incarnation of this docu-
ment differs in their view in important ways from the first. But
still the current incarnation is derived from the first incarnation.
11. ld. at 1354.
12. See BoRK, supra note 1, at 154.
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Moreover, I do not believe that any nonoriginalist or critical-
legal-studies proponent would deny this, which means that we
are all originalists, at least to some extent. The only question is
one of degree, which brings up the next question, the one that
the nonoriginalists have raised, which is that originalism is not
particularly useful because it does not really constrain judges. In
fact, it is really bad, the other side would argue, because not only
does it fail to constrain judges, it allows judges to do whatever
they want under the guise of being constrained by this seemingly
neutral doctrine called originalism. And in my view, the most
pernicious form of this argument is the one made by Ronald
Dworkin, who seems to say that originalism is no good, because it
is not an absolute constraint on judges.13
In his very interesting essays in the New York Review oj Books,
Dworkin bashes Bork's brand of originalism by parading out a
series of examples in which Bork's approach would yield indeter-
minate or even willfully imposed results.14 The problem with this
analysis, in my view, is that it succumbs to a fallacy first noted by
Ronald Coase, and characterized by Harold Demsetz as the "Nir-
vana" form of analysis.15 In other words, it is not enough to say
that originalism does not perfectly constrain policymakers. The
critical question is whether originalism constrains policymakers
better than the next best alternative.
For some variance of originalism to prevail, all one has to
show, and I think this is more or less consistent with what Lillian
BeVier was saying in her remarks,16 is that originalism acts as a
partial constraint. That is, it is a better constraint than the open-
ended alternatives most often advanced by the critics of original-
ism. In other words, the best defense of some kind of originalism
is that it constrains, checks, and guides judges better than these
other alternatives, which do not even try to limit the power of
judges.
Finally, we ought to recognize that people on the other side do
not like originalism for the same reason that originalists do not
like judicial activists. And the reason for that is because the other
13. See Ronald Dworkin, The Porum Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 471-76 (1981).
14. See Ronald Dworkin, The Bark Namination, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1987, at 3;
Ronald Dworkin, Prom Bark to Kennedy, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Dec. 17, 1987, at 36; Ronald
Dworkin, Reagan's]ustice, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 8, 1984, at 27.
15. See Ronald Coase, Discussion, 54 AM. ECON. REv. (Papers & Proc.) 194-97 (1964);
Harold Demsetz, Infonnation and EffidencJ: Another Vzewpoint, 12J.L. & ECON.
16. See BeVier, supra note 2.
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side finds the positions, the substantive positions, generated by
this method of interpretation to be odious.
That is to say, ifyou look at an originalist position in the Con-
stitution, one must go back and observe the basic perspectives of
the Framers. They strongly believed in private ownership and
free enterprise. They constructed the separation of powers, the
system of checks and balances, and judicial review to protect
things like property rights.I7 At bottom, that is what this debate is
about, and originalists ought to be honest about it, just as the
nonoriginalists ought to be honest about the results-oriented ap-
proach of their positions.
The basic arguments in favor ofjudicial review stem from the
observations that judges are supposed to be independent, that
they are supposed to be insulated from the vagaries of interest
group pressures and from the push and pull of the day-to-day
political process. This sort of political insulation, which is an un-
deniable element of the fundamental structure of the U.S. Con-
stitution must be rendered compatible with an originalist
interpretation. It is certainly incompatible with the notion that
the Constitution is a "living document" that is supposed to evolve
to reflect current attitudes and prejudices. Mter all, ifyou really
want the Constitution to be dynamic, why do you need judges to
be independent, where they are free to reject the will of the peo-
ple? Thus, Bork's brand of originalism, which relegates the fed-
eral courts to an extremely passive role vis-a.-vis Congress, seems
incompatible with the basic structure of government established
by the Framers. The U.S. Constitution emphatically separates the
judicial role from the legislative role and makes the judiciary in-
dependent-presumably for a reason.
Put another way, the stability norm for having an independent
judiciary is inextricably related to the idea of originalism. Simi-
larly, the basic criteria that everybody-from Tribe to Bork-ap-
plies to the selection criteria by which we choose judges is
fundamentally originalist. These people, I suspect, will disagree
about who meets that selection criteria, but these people all
agree that we ought to look for good lawyers, people withjudicial
temperament, people who are able to reason well using common
law methodology. This means that judges are supposed to be
17. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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able to do legal research, to treat like cases alike, and above all,
to be able to recognize and distinguish applicable precedents.
Now, these are not the selection criteria that we would use for
selecting judges if we were not originalists of some kind. If we
were not originalists, if we were going to be true activists for a
particular political ideology, why not just pick the best philoso-
pher or the best economist that you can find to do the job of
applying the Constitution to changing norms of fairness, or to
changing economic conditions? Why does everybody seem to
agree that we want lawyers to be judges, unless we are all
originalists?
So basically my idea is thatjudicial review is extremely difficult
to justify in our system without some manifestation of original-
ism. In sum, we are all originalists after a fashion. This is because
the very act of engaging in constitutional interpretation, whether
by judges or law professors or legislators, is the act of being en-
gaged in the process, however abstract, of figuring out what the
Framers' wishes were. In engaging in judicial review, a judge is
recognizing that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land,
an idea that is only possible from an originalist point of view.
True, those who embrace the idea of a living Constitution and
who purport to reject the concept, much less the teachings, of
originalism, assert that the Framers' own Constitution exerts
much less gravitational force on policy-makers than originalists
would assert, but that is all they assert. In other words, the differ-
ence between originalists and nonoriginalists is only a matter of
degree. Everybody agrees that the Framers' original design exerts
at least some pull. To see how this is true, consider the following:
those who reject originalism reject it only occasionally. They fully
embrace originalism whenever the originalist methodology gen-
erates results that they find congenial.IS They use originalism as
their trump card whenever they possibly can.
18. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (concluding "that ajury ofsix
satisfies the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases"). The major-
ity's holding in the case provoked an impassioned dissent, steeped in originalist language,
from a very unusual source:
We deal here not with some minor tinkering with the role of the civil jury, but
with its wholesale abolition and replacement with a different institution which
functions differently, produces different results, and was wholly unknown to the
Framers of the Seventh Amendment.
When a historical approach is applied to the issue at hand, it cannot be
doubted that the Framers envisioned ajury of12 when they referred to a trial by
jury....
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that originalism is not the binding constraint
on judges that its most ardent proponents would have us believe,
the fact remains that, absent originalism,judicial review-at least
byjudges-would be much, much harder to justify. On the other
hand, it is also the case that Judge Bork is probably wrong to
conclude that originalism must yield the kind ofjudicial restraint
he triumphs. The reality is that the Framers were staunch sup.-
porters of free markets. It is also true that they were very suspi-
cious of legislatures. They understood public choice and interest
group politics very well. That is why they erected a governmental
structure with checks'and balances, and a separation of power~.
The whole point of the design was to raise the transaction costs
of government. That is why originalism and judicial activism are
not unrelated concepts. Judicial activism in pursuit of free mar-
kets, which the Framers understood were crucial to the sunival
of the Republic, should be encouraged. In other words, judicial
activism is not the problem. The problem is the nonoriginalist,
anti-free marketjudicial activism that is so closely associated with
those who reject the originalist position.
I think history will bear out the proposition that when constitutional rights are
grounded in nothing more solid than the intuitive, unexplained sense of five
Justices that a certain line is "right" or "just," those rights are certain to erode
and, eventually, disappear altogether. Today, a m~ority of this Court may find
six-man juries to represent a proper balance between competing demands of
expedition and group representation. But as dockets become more crowded and
pressures on jury trials grow, who is to say that some future Court will not find
three, or two, or one a number large enough to satisfy its unexplicated sense of
justice? It should be clear that constitutional rights which are so vulnerable to
pressures of the moment are not really protected by the Constitution at all..•.
• • • It may well be that the number 12 is no more than a "historical accident"
and is "wholly without significance 'except to mystics.'" But surely there is noth-
ing more significant about the number six, or three, or one. The line must be
drawn somewhere, and the difference between drawing it in the light of history
and drawing it on an ad hoc basis is, ultimately, the difference between inter-
preting a Constitution and making it up as one goes along.
Id. at 166-82 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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